UNITED NATIONS,
August 4 – After North Korea's
most recent missile, of the
draft (below) UN Security
Council resolution Russia's
Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia
said he is "aware but not well
aware." When asked if it could
be voted on as early at August
4 he said it had yet to be
discussed in the appropriate
way. But while UNSC President
set a Saturday, August 5 vote
on the US-drafted resolution,
on the evening of August 4 the
UN itself allow North Korea to
censor an art exhibit in its
lobby (exclusive Inner City
Press coverage here),
at an event attended by
(former?) US Mission to the UN
spokesperson Kurtis
Cooper. On August 4
Inner City Press notice a sign
outside windowless UN
Conference Room A, of a
"Mission of the United States
of America: Security Council
Experts Meeting [Closed]," to
begin at 11 am. Photo here.
Inner City Press staked it
out, but no one went into the
room at that time. Now here is
the draft:
" DPRK UNSCR: Recalling its
previous relevant resolutions,
including resolution 825
(1993), resolution 1540
(2004), resolution 1695
(2006), resolution 1718
(2006), resolution 1874
(2009), resolution 1887
(2009), resolution 2087
(2013), resolution 2094
(2013), resolution 2270
(2016), resolution 2321
(2016), and resolution 2356
(2017), as well as the
statements of its President of
6 October 2006
(S/PRST/2006/41), 13 April
2009 (S/PRST/2009/7) and 16
April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/13),
Reaffirming that proliferation
of nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons, as well as
their means of delivery,
constitutes a threat to
international peace and
security,
Expressing its gravest concern
at the July 3 and July 28 of
2017 ballistic missile tests
by the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (“the
DPRK”), which the DPRK has
stated were tests of
intercontinental ballistic
missiles, in violation of
resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874
(2009), 2087 (2013), 2094
(2013), 2270 (2016) 2321
(2016), and 2356 (2017), and
at the challenge such tests
constitute to the Treaty on
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (“the NPT”) and to
international efforts aimed at
strengthening the global
regime of non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons, and the
danger they pose to peace and
stability in the region and
beyond,
Underlining once again the
importance that the DPRK
respond to other security and
humanitarian concerns of the
international community,
Underlining also that measures
imposed by this resolution are
not intended to have adverse
humanitarian consequences for
the civilian population of the
DPRK,
Expressing serious concern
that the DPRK has continued to
violate relevant Security
Council resolutions through
repeated launches and
attempted launches of
ballistic missiles, and noting
that all such ballistic
missile activities contribute
to the DPRK’s development of
nuclear weapons delivery
systems and increase tension
in the region and beyond,
Expressing continued concern
that the DPRK is abusing the
privileges and immunities
accorded under the Vienna
Conventions on Diplomatic and
Consular Relations,
Expressing great concern that
the DPRK’s prohibited arms
sales have generated revenues
that are diverted to the
pursuit of nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles while DPRK
citizens have unmet needs,
Expressing its gravest concern
that the DPRK's ongoing
nuclear- and ballistic
missile-related activities
have further generated
increased tension in the
region and beyond, and
determining that there
continues to exist a clear
threat to international peace
and security,
Acting under Chapter VII of
the Charter of the United
Nations, and taking measures
under its Article 41,
1. Condemns in the strongest
terms the ballistic missile
launches conducted by the DPRK
on 3 July and 28 July of 2017,
which the DPRK has stated were
launches of intercontinental
ballistic missiles, and which
used ballistic missile
technology in violation and
flagrant disregard of the
Security Council's
resolutions;?
2. Reaffirms its decisions
that the DPRK shall not
conduct any further launches
that use ballistic missile
technology, nuclear tests, or
any other provocation; shall
suspend all activities related
to its ballistic missile
program and in this context
re-establish its pre-existing
commitments to a moratorium on
missile launches; shall
abandon all nuclear weapons
and existing nuclear programs
in a complete, verifiable and
irreversible manner, and
immediately cease all related
activities; and shall abandon
any other existing weapons of
mass destruction and ballistic
missile programs in a
complete, verifiable and
irreversible manner;
Designations
3. Decides that the measures
specified in paragraph 8(d) of
resolution 1718 (2006) shall
apply also to the individuals
and entities listed in Annex I
and II of this resolution and
to any individuals or entities
acting on their behalf or at
their direction, and to
entities owned or controlled
by them, including through
illicit means, and decides
further that the measures
specified in paragraph 8(e) of
resolution 1718 (2006) shall
also apply to the individuals
listed in Annex I of this
resolution and to individuals
acting on their behalf or at
their direction; ?
4. Decides to adjust the
measures imposed by paragraph
8 of resolution 1718 (2006)
and this resolution through
the designation of additional
goods, directs the Committee
to undertake its tasks to this
effect and to report to the
Security Council within
fifteen days of adoption of
this resolution, and further
decides that, if the Committee
has not acted, then the
Security Council will complete
action to adjust the measures
within seven days of receiving
that report; ?
5. Decides to adjust the
measures imposed by paragraph
7 of resolution 2321 (2016)
through the designation of
additional conventional
arms-related items, materials,
equipment, goods, and
technology, directs the
Committee to undertake its
tasks to this effect and to
report to the Security Council
within thirty days of adoption
of this resolution, further
decides that, if the Committee
has not acted, then the
Security Council will complete
action to adjust the measures
within seven days of receiving
that report, and directs the
Committee to update this list
every 12 months;
Transportation
6. Decides that the Committee
may designate vessels for
which it has information
indicating they are, or have
been, related to activities
prohibited by resolutions 1718
(2006), 1874 (2009), 2087
(2013), 2094 (2013), 2270
(2016), 2321 (2016), 2356
(2017), or this resolution and
all Member States shall
prohibit the entry into their
ports of such designated
vessels, unless entry is
required in the case of
emergency or in the case of
return to its port of
origination, or unless the
Committee determines in
advance that such entry is
required for humanitarian
purposes or any other purposes
consistent with the objectives
of resolutions 1718 (2006),
1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094
(2013), 2270 (2016), 2321
(2016), 2356 (2017), or this
resolution;
7. Clarifies that the measures
set forth in paragraph 20 of
resolution 2270 (2016) and
paragraph 9 of resolution 2321
(2016), requiring States to
prohibit their nationals,
persons subject to their
jurisdiction and entities
incorporated in their
territory or subject to their
jurisdiction from owning,
leasing, operating any vessel
flagged by the DPRK, without
exception, unless the
Committee approves on a
case-by-case basis in advance,
apply to chartering vessels
flagged by the DPRK;
Sectoral
8. Decides that paragraph 26
of resolution 2321 (2016)
shall be replaced by the
following:
“Decides that the DPRK shall
not supply, sell or transfer,
directly or indirectly, from
its territory or by its
nationals or using its flag
vessels or aircraft, coal,
iron, and iron ore, and that
all States shall prohibit the
procurement of such material
from the DPRK by their
nationals, or using their flag
vessels or aircraft, and
whether or not originating in
the territory of the DPRK,
decides that for sales and
transactions of iron and iron
ore for which written
contracts have been finalized
prior to the adoption of this
resolution, all States may
allow those shipments to be
imported into their
territories up to 30 days from
the date of adoption of this
resolution with notification
provided to the Committee
containing details on those
imports by no later than 45
days after the date of
adoption of this resolution,
and decides further that this
provision shall not apply with
respect to coal that the
exporting State confirms on
the basis of credible
information has originated
outside the DPRK and was
transported through the DPRK
solely for export from the
Port of Rajin (Rason),
provided that the exporting
State notifies the Committee
in advance and such
transactions involving coal
originating outside of the
DPRK are unrelated to
generating revenue for the
DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic
missile programs or other
activities prohibited by
resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874
(2009), 2087 (2013), 2094
(2013), 2270 (2016), 2321
(2016), 2356 (2017), or this
resolution;
9. Decides that the DPRK shall
not supply, sell or transfer,
directly or indirectly, from
its territory or by its
nationals or using its flag
vessels or aircraft, seafood
(including fish, crustaceans,
mollusks, and other aquatic
invertebrates in all forms),
and that all States shall
prohibit the procurement of
such items from the DPRK by
their nationals, or using
their flag vessels or
aircraft, whether or not
originating in the territory
of the DPRK, and further
decides that for sales and
transactions of seafood
(including fish, crustaceans,
mollusks, and other aquatic
invertebrates in all forms)
for which written contracts
have been finalized prior to
the adoption of this
resolution, all States may
allow those shipments to be
imported into their
territories up to 30 days from
the date of adoption of this
resolution with notification
provided to the Committee
containing details on those
imports by no later than 45
days after the date of
adoption of this resolution;
10. Decides that the DPRK
shall not supply, sell or
transfer, directly or
indirectly, from its territory
or by its nationals or using
its flag vessels or aircraft,
lead and lead ore, and that
all States shall prohibit the
procurement of such items from
the DPRK by their nationals,
or using their flag vessels or
aircraft, whether or not
originating in the territory
of the DPRK, and further
decides that for sales and
transactions of lead and lead
ore for which written
contracts have been finalized
prior to the adoption of this
resolution, all States may
allow those shipments to be
imported into their
territories up to 30 days from
the date of adoption of this
resolution with notification
provided to the Committee
containing details on those
imports by no later than 45
days after the date of
adoption of this resolution;
11. Expresses concern that
DPRK nationals frequently work
in other States for the
purpose of generating foreign
export earnings that the DPRK
uses to support its prohibited
nuclear and ballistic missile
programs, decides that all
Member States shall not exceed
on any date after the date of
adoption of this resolution
the total number of work
authorizations for DPRK
nationals provided in their
jurisdictions at the time of
the adoption of this
resolution unless the
Committee approves on a
case-by-case basis in advance
that employment of additional
DPRK nationals beyond the
number of work authorizations
provided in a member state’s
jurisdiction at the time of
the adoption of this
resolution is required for the
delivery of humanitarian
assistance, denuclearization
or any other purpose
consistent with the objectives
of resolutions 1718 (2006),
1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094
(2013), 2270 (2016), 2321
(2016), 2356 (2017), or this
resolution;
Financial
12. Decides that States shall
prohibit, by their nationals
or in their territories, the
opening of new joint ventures
or cooperative entities with
DPRK entities or individuals,
or the expansion of existing
joint ventures through
additional investments,
whether or not acting for or
on behalf of the government of
the DPRK, unless such joint
ventures or cooperative
entities have been approved by
the Committee in advance on a
case-by-case basis;
13. Clarifies that the
prohibitions contained in
paragraph 11 of resolution
2094 (2013) apply to clearing
of funds through all Member
States’ territories;
14. Clarifies that companies
performing financial services
commensurate with those
provided by banks are
considered financial
institutions for the purposes
of implementing paragraph 11
of resolution 2094 (2013),
paragraphs 33 and 34 of
resolution 2270 (2016), and
paragraph 33 of resolution
2321 (2016);
Chemical Weapons
15. Recalls paragraph 24 of
resolution 2270 (2016),
decides that the DPRK shall
not deploy or use chemical
weapons, and urgently calls
upon the DPRK to accede to the
Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and
Their Destruction, and then to
immediately comply with its
provisions;
Vienna Convention
16. Demands that the DPRK
fully comply with its
obligations under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic
Relations and the Vienna
Convention on Consular
Relations;
Impact on the People of the
DPRK
17. Regrets the DPRK's massive
diversion of its scarce
resources toward its
development of nuclear weapons
and a number of expensive
ballistic missile programs,
notes the findings of the
United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian
Assistance that well over half
of the people in the DPRK
suffer from major insecurities
in food and medical care,
including a very large number
of pregnant and lactating
women and under-five children
who are at risk of
malnutrition and nearly a
quarter of its total
population suffering from
chronic malnutrition, and, in
this context, expresses deep
concern at the grave hardship
to which the people in the
DPRK are subjected;
Sanctions Implementation
18. Decides that Member States
shall report to the Security
Council within ninety days of
the adoption of this
resolution, and thereafter
upon request by the Committee,
on concrete measures they have
taken in order to implement
effectively the provisions of
this resolution, requests the
Panel of Experts, in
cooperation with other UN
sanctions monitoring groups,
to continue its efforts to
assist Member States in
preparing and submitting such
reports in a timely manner;
19. Calls upon all Member
States to redouble efforts to
implement in full the measures
in resolutions 1718 (2006),
1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094
(2013) 2270 (2016), 2321
(2016), and 2356 (2017), and
to cooperate with each other
in doing so, particularly with
respect to inspecting,
detecting and seizing items
the transfer of which is
prohibited by these
resolutions;
20. Decides that the
mandate of the Committee, as
set out in paragraph 12 of
resolution 1718 (2006), shall
apply with respect to the
measures imposed in this
resolution and further decides
that the mandate of the Panel
of Experts, as specified in
paragraph 26 of resolution
1874 (2009) and modified in
paragraph 1 of resolution 2345
(2017), shall also apply with
respect to the measures
imposed in this resolution;
21. Decides to authorize all
Member States to, and that all
Member States shall, seize and
dispose (such as through
destruction, rendering
inoperable or unusable,
storage, or transferring to a
State other than the
originating or destination
States for disposal) of items
the supply, sale, transfer, or
export of which is prohibited
by resolutions 1718 (2006),
1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094
(2013), 2270 (2016), 2321
(2016), 2356 (2017), or this
resolution that are identified
in inspections, in a manner
that is not inconsistent with
their obligations under
applicable Security Council
resolutions, including
resolution 1540 (2004), as
well as any obligations of
parties to the NPT, the
Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Development of 29 April
1997, and the Convention on
the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on Their Destruction of 10
April 1972;
22. Emphasizes the importance
of all States, including the
DPRK, taking the necessary
measures to ensure that no
claim shall lie at the
instance of the DPRK, or of
any person or entity in the
DPRK, or of persons or
entities designated for
measures set forth in
resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874
(2009), 2087 (2013), 2094
(2013), 2270 (2016), 2321
(2016), 2356 (2017), or this
resolution, or any person
claiming through or for the
benefit of any such person or
entity, in connection with any
contract or other transaction
where its performance was
prevented by reason of the
measures imposed by this
resolution or previous
resolutions;
23. Requests that Interpol
issue Special Notices with
respect to designated
individuals, and directs the
Committee to work with
Interpol to develop the
appropriate arrangements to do
so;
24. Requests the Secretary
General to provide additional
analytical resources needed to
the Panel of Experts
established pursuant to
resolution 1874 (2009) to
strengthen its ability to
analyze the DPRK’s sanctions
violation and evasion
activities;
Political
25. Reiterates its deep
concern at the grave hardship
that the people in the DPRK
are subjected to, condemns the
DPRK for pursuing nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles
instead of the welfare of its
people while people in the
DPRK have great unmet needs,
and emphasizes the necessity
of the DPRK respecting and
ensuring the welfare and
inherent dignity of people in
the DPRK;
26. Reaffirms that the
measures imposed by
resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874
(2009), 2087 (2013), 2094
(2013), 2270 (2016), 2321
(2016), 2356 (2017), and this
resolution are not intended to
have adverse humanitarian
consequences for the civilian
population of the DPRK or to
affect negatively or restrict
those activities, including
economic activities and
cooperation, food aid and
humanitarian assistance, that
are not prohibited by
resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874
(2009), 2087 (2013), 2094
(2013), 2270 (2016), 2321
(2016), 2356 (2017) and this
resolution, and the work of
international and
non-governmental organizations
carrying out assistance and
relief activities in the DPRK
for the benefit of the
civilian population of the
DPRK and decides that the
Committee may, on a
case-by-case basis, exempt any
activity from the measures
imposed by these resolutions
if the committee determines
that such an exemption is
necessary to facilitate the
work of such organizations in
the DPRK or for any other
purpose consistent with the
objectives of these
resolutions, and further
decides that the measures
specified in paragraph 8(d) of
resolution 1718 (2006) shall
not apply with respect to
financial transactions with
the DPRK Foreign Trade Bank or
the Korea National Insurance
Corporation if such
transactions are solely for
the operation of diplomatic or
consular missions in the DPRK
or humanitarian assistance
activities that are undertaken
by, or in coordination with,
the United Nations;
27. Reaffirms its support for
the Six Party Talks, calls for
their resumption, and
reiterates its support for the
commitments set forth in the
Joint Statement of 19
September 2005 issued by
China, the DPRK, Japan, the
Republic of Korea, the Russian
Federation, and the United
States, including that the
goal of the Six-Party Talks is
the verifiable
denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula in a peaceful
manner, that the United States
and the DPRK undertook to
respect each other's
sovereignty and exist
peacefully together, that the
Six Parties undertook to
promote economic cooperation,
and all other relevant
commitments;
28. Reiterates the importance
of maintaining peace and
stability on the Korean
Peninsula and in north-east
Asia at large, and expresses
its commitment to a peaceful,
diplomatic, and political
solution to the situation and
welcomes efforts by the
council members as well as
other States to facilitate a
peaceful and comprehensive
solution through dialogue and
stresses the importance of
working to reduce tensions in
the Korean Peninsula and
beyond;
29. Affirms that it shall keep
the DPRK’s actions under
continuous review and is
prepared to strengthen,
modify, suspend or lift the
measures as may be needed in
light of the DPRK’s
compliance, and, in this
regard, expresses its
determination to take further
significant measures in the
event of a further DPRK
nuclear test or launch;
Decides to
remain seized of the matter."
By the afternoon
a lone Security "Council
diplomat" was spoon-feeding Reuters
that on Saturday, with a high
likelihood, the Council would
ban
exports of coal, iron, iron
ore, lead, lead ore and
seafood. Seafood!
What about the UN's World
Intellectual Property
Organization's work on North
Korea's cyancide patent? The
UN, and the wire service, were
fine with that, as they were
with now-convicted Macau based
businessman Ng Lap Seng buying
the UN, its Department of
Public Information and its allies.
Absurdly CBS on July 29 had a
headline about the US wanting
a UN Security Council meeting,
including in the body of a the
story Nikki Haley's quote that
"We have not called for a
meeting." Photo
here. On July 31, Inner
City Press asked the president
of the Security Council for
July, Liu Jieyi of China, if
any question for a meeting had
been received, and he said no.
Yet CBS still had the story
up, and was re-tweeting it,
see below. As Inner City Press
noted, this from a media which
never reported on the UN's
World Intellectual Property
Organization working on North
Korea's cyanide
patent - nor, hardly, on
the six guilty
verdicts in the UN bribery
case, even as the UN says it
should be paid for its
corruption in the Ng Lap Seng
UN bribery case. Now Nikki
Haley has directly denied the
CBS story, calling it
misreporting: "Following North
Korea’s second ICBM launch on
Friday, many have asked
whether the United States will
seek an emergency Security
Council session on Monday.
Some have even misreported
that we are seeking such a
session. That is mistaken.
There is no point in having an
emergency session if it
produces nothing of
consequence. North Korea is
already subject to numerous
Security Council resolutions
that they violate with
impunity and that are not
complied with by all UN Member
States. An additional Security
Council resolution that does
not significantly increase the
international pressure on
North Korea is of no value. In
fact, it is worse than
nothing, because it sends the
message to the North Korean
dictator that the
international community is
unwilling to seriously
challenge him. China must
decide whether it is finally
willing to take this vital
step. The time for talk is
over. The danger the North
Korean regime poses to
international peace is now
clear to all." Eight hours
after this, CBS re-tweeted the
story. Due to this,
extrapolating who the non-US
source could be, we note
sycophantry to the South
Korean mission, given that its
Ban Ki-moon was Secretary
General. We again note that
Monday, July 31 is the last
day of China's presidency of
the UN Security Council, with
an end of presidency event at
6:30 pm (we'll go and rush
back to meet the UN's 7 pm
censorship deadline imposed
for reporting on UN
corruption, and continued amid
critiques);
Egypt
takes over the presidency on
Tuesday, August 1. We'll have
more on this. From Washington,
Tillerson then Trump: "The
United States strongly
condemns North Korea’s launch
of an intercontinental
ballistic missile, the second
this month, in blatant
violation of multiple United
Nations Security Council
resolutions that reflect the
will of the international
community. All nations should
take a strong public stance
against North Korea, by
maintaining and strengthening
UN sanctions to ensure North
Korea will face consequences
for its relentless pursuit of
nuclear weapons and the means
to deliver them. As the
principal economic enablers of
North Korea’s nuclear weapon
and ballistic missile
development program, China and
Russia bear unique and special
responsibility for this
growing threat to regional and
global stability. The United
States seeks the peaceful
denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula and the end to
belligerent actions by North
Korea. As we and others
have made clear, we will never
accept a nuclear-armed North
Korea nor abandon our
commitment to our allies and
partners in the region."
Trump: "North Korea’s test
launch today of another
intercontinental ballistic
missile—the second such test
in less than a month—is only
the latest reckless and
dangerous action by the North
Korean regime. The
United States condemns this
test and rejects the regime’s
claim that these tests—and
these weapons—ensure North
Korea’s security. In
reality, they have the
opposite effect. By
threatening the world, these
weapons and tests further
isolate North Korea, weaken
its economy, and deprive its
people. The United
States will take all necessary
steps to ensure the security
of the American homeland and
protect our allies in the
region." Back after the
missile on on June 3-4, UN
Secretary General was in his
stomping ground of Lisbon,
Portugal, after days of his
spokesman not disclosing where
he was. Meanwhile the UN
system continues to recruit
internationally for "Junior
Professional Officers" to work
for it in Pyongyang, here
- Inner City Press on July 5
asked UN Spokesman Stephane
Dujarric about that,
and for all details on any
North Korean participation in
or agreements with the UN JPO
program. On July 10, Inner
City Press asked the head of
the UN's Department of
Economic and Social Affairs Wu
Hongbo, who said he'd read
Inner City Press' previous
coverage, to explain if North
Korea can as it has at WIPO
place a staffer into the UN
Department of Political
Affairs. Video here.
His answer(s) didn't make it
clear that North Korea can't.
On July 7, after Dujarric had
not answered for two days,
Inner City Press asked again
and it turned out Dujarric had
an answer he would not have
given if not asked again, in
the briefing. From the UN transcript:
Inner City Press: on the JPO
[Junior Professional Officer],
I asked a couple of days ago
about whether the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea has
reported a memorandum for
Junior Professional Officers
program with the UN. Do
they, and are they sending
anyone?
Spokesman: I think I
have something, which is
basically that based on the…
first of all, that the JPO
programme is open to every
Member State, all right.
Based on expression of
interest of [Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea] as
a Member State of the UN, and
in accordance with relevant
resolutions from [Economic and
Social Council] from March,
the Permanent Mission of the
DPRK and the UN reached a
memorandum of understanding,
the provision of JPOs without
prejudice. While the
memorandum of understanding is
concluded, the provision of a
JPO to the UN is subject to
the identification by the
organization of programmatic
needs and suitable candidates
who meet the qualifications,
competencies, ability to
perform duties and other
requirements, set by the
receiving Department.
The selected candidate is
subject to UN staff rules and
resolutions, including the
obligation not to seek or
accept instruction in regard
to performance of duties from
any Government or any other
source external to the UN, as
per Article 100 of the
Charter.
Inner City Press: At least one
published report identified or
described an individual — they
said — is already in the
pipeline, mentioned the
Department of Political
Affairs as the target and said
that a Permanent
Representative has spoken to
António Guterres in opposition
to this. You say it's
open to all, but is it also
open to… are there
considerations of not, for
example, placing a national of
a country, for example, under
a sanctions system to work in
the DPA or SCAD Sanctions
Office about that country?
Spokesman: I think,
obviously, first of all, it's
up to the UN and to the
Department to identify the
programmatic needs and where
that person would be best…
best used.
The UN's
World Intellectual Property
Organization had defended
working on cyanide patents for
North Korea, and Guterres'
spokespeople had defended it.
But on July 4 the UN issued
this: "The Secretary-General
strongly condemns the launch
of a ballistic missile of
possible intercontinental
range conducted by the
Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (DPRK) on 4 July
2017. This action is yet
another brazen violation of
Security Council resolutions
and constitutes a dangerous
escalation of the situation.
The DPRK leadership must cease
further provocative actions
and comply fully with its
international obligations. The
Secretary-General underlines
the importance of maintaining
the unity of the international
community in addressing this
serious challenge." The US
Mission's subsequent press
release said, "A short time
ago, Ambassador Nikki Haley
and her counterparts from
Japan and the Republic of
Korea requested an emergency
UN Security Council meeting to
be held in the open chamber in
response to North Korea’s
intercontinental ballistic
missile launch. The Security
Council session will be held
tomorrow afternoon at 3:00
p.m. EDT." After the last
launch, the UN Security
Council added to its sanctions
list 14 individuals and four
companies. Inner City Press
put the resolution online here.
This as some on the UN
Security Council, and UN
Secretary General Antonio
Guterres or at least his
spokesman Stephane
Dujarric have no problem
with or comment on the UN's
own World Intellectual
Property Organization helps
North Korea with a patent
application for social cyanide
(WIPO site here).
On
Capitol Hill on June 28, Rep.
Chris Smith (R-NJ) urged US
Ambassador to the UN Nikki
Haley to act on WIPO,
including its retaliation
against whistleblowers. Haley
spoke about reviewing
peacekeeping missions, which
is needed - as is a review and
reversal of the UN's lack of
protections for free press,
and continued restrictions on
investigative Press. At the
day's UN noon briefing Inner
City Press asked UN Spokesman
Stephane Dujarric, UN
Transcript here:
Inner City Press: down in
Washington this morning,
there's a hearing in the
committee… House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and the issue
of the… the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO),
not only its dealings with
patents for North Korea, but
its retaliation against its
own staff, you know, has been
raised. So, I've asked
you about it before. I
just wanted to know, what does
the Secretary-General… given
there's even some provisions
of US law about failure to
protect whistle-blowers, has
he taken any action on the…
the numerous cases within WIPO
of…?
Spokesman: The Sec… WIPO
is an independent agency,
specialized agency. It
has its own governing body, on
which the United States is
represented. I expect
those discussions are going on
between the US and WIPO… the
WIPO leadership, and I really
have nothing else to add than
what I've previously said on
the issue.
Inner City Press: Right, but
given that they're a part of
the Chief Executives Board
(CEB) and there are certain, I
guess, minimum standards in
the UN system, such as not
using criminal defamation
against the press, I would
assume…?
Spokesman: As a matter
of principle, the Sec… and
this goes across the board for
every organization. The
Secretary-General expects all
UN agencies, whether
specialized or not, to… to
uphold standards… minimum
standards. But, I'm not
going to go into the details
of WIPO management, which is
an issue that WIPO management
will… dealing with, with its
own governing body.
The UN
Secretariat alsobacked up WIPO
on May 26 when Inner City
Press asked, transcript here
and below. Inner City Press on
May 16 began to ask US
Ambassador to the UN Nikki
Haley about it (video
here).
On May 17, Nikki
Haley replied to Inner City
Press' question: "All parts of
the UN system need to support
the Security Council in its
efforts to respond to the
grave threat of North Korea’s
weapons of mass destruction
programs. Sodium cyanide is
banned for export to North
Korea by the Security Council.
A common sense reaction would
be for WIPO to inform the
Council of such patent
applications. Its failure to
do so may have dangerous
consequences.”
The UN through
spokesman Stephane Dujarric
told Inner City Press it
supports WIPO, video
here. On May 19, Inner
City Press asked North Korea's
Ambassador Kim In Ryong about
it, without answer. Video
here. Then the US
Mission to the UN issued a
longer press release, here.
On May 26, Inner City Press
asked the UN's deputy
spokesperson Farhan Haq to
respond. UN transcript:
Inner City Press: since, since
I last asked, the US Mission
has put out a second,
more-detailed statement about
the World Intellectual
Property Organization's (WIPO)
work on the sodium cyanide
patent for either a North
Korean individual or the
Government. They seem to
insist that there was no need
for them to inform the
Sanctions Committee that
everything is fine with
that. And I wanted to
know, what does the
Secretary-General think, given
his calls and his own
statements that all Member
States take this very
seriously both, implementing…
does he think that WIPO has
met all of its obligations and
that it should continue in the
future to do patent work in
North Korea on cyanide without
informing the Committee?
Deputy Spokesman: Well,
as you're aware, the World
Intellectual Property
Organization has, twice now,
on its website, put
explanations of its actions,
and we would refer you to what
they have said on this.
Of course, the
Secretary-General does want
all Member States, and,
indeed, all parts of the UN,
to abide by Security Council
resolutions, but you can see
what the explanation is
provided by WIPO itself.
Question: But, what does
he think of their
explanation? I guess
that's my question. He's
the head of the UN
System. Does he think…
obviously, there are some that
think that the…
what they're saying is
asinine, and they think that
it's fine. So, I'm
asking what does he think of
it?
Deputy Spokesman: We're
aware of what their
explanation is, and we refer
you back over to them.
That is not
leadership. Inner City Press
adds: condemnation should also
include the UN Federal Credit
Union, which is soliciting the
funds of the North Korean
mission and its employees, as
well as UNA-USA members. Inner
City Press on the morning of
May 18 asked the chair of the
UN Security Council's North
Korea sanctions committee, the
Italian Mission to the UN
under Sebastiano Cardi, "Does
your Mission, which holds the
chair of the 1718 Committee,
agree that WIPO should have
informed the Security Council
of this work with North Korea?
I recently asked Ambassador
Cardi about a DPRK sanctions
violation in Germany, without
yet much of a response. I
notice that the Italian
mission stopped sending Inner
City Press any information at
all in February 2017. Please
explain." In the afternoon,
the Italian Mission's
spokesperson Giovanni Davoli
replied, "the Panel of Experts
was not aware of this matter.
Therefore the Committee could
not be. The Panel announced
they are going to open an
investigation. Once the
Committee will receive the
report of the panel, we might
be able to comment further."
We await that, and another
answer.
Inner City Press also on
May 18 asked UN Spokesman
Stephane Dujarric about
Ambassador Haley's response -
but all Dujarric would do was
refer, positively, to a WIPO
press release. In its press
release, WIPO says "a DPRK
individual citizen applicant
filed an international patent
application under WIPO’s PCT
system in respect of a process
for production of sodium
cyanide." Are there really
"individual applicants" in
today's North Korea? Isn't the
import of sodium cyanide into
North Korea a violation of UN
sanctions? Dujarric called
this WIPO's "very clear
explanation." Inner City Press
repeatedly asked Dujarric to
state if the Secretariat finds
WIPO's statement on May 16 --
before Ambassador Haley's
response -- sufficient.
Apparently yes. We'll have
more on this: Inner City Press
has asked other UN Security
Council members. Watch this
site. In an earlier exchange
with UN Spokesman Stephane
Dujarric, the UN itself
acknowledged that the Security
Council's Panel of Experts is
belatedly looking into it as a
possible sanctions violation.
Video
here, transcript below.
Later to May's President of
the UN Security Council,
Uruguay's Elbio Rosselli,
Inner City Press asked about
UN WIPO's (non) compliance
with UN sanctions, working on
a patent for North Korea's
production of sodium cyanide.
Periscope video here.
Ambassador Rosselli said
he had not heard of the issue.
At the UN's May 16 noon
briefing, Inner City Press had
asked the UN about that and
its reporting that the UN
Federal Credit Union,
regulated by the US National
Credit Union Administration,
openly solicits the business
of both North Korean employees
of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea's mission to
the UN and the members of the
UN Association of the USA
(UNA-USA), amid questions of
immunity and a previous UNFCU
settlement for sanctions
violations. UN
briefing video here,
from Min 10:20.
UN Spokesman
Stephane Dujarric dodged on
whether Secretary General
Antonio Guterres would this
time talk to WIPO chief
Francis Gurry, as he did not
as Gurry deployed criminal
defamation law against the
press; he also wouldn't answer
on UNFCU. UN transcript:
Inner City Press: About
WIPO [World Intellectual
Property Organization] doing a
patent application for North
Korea for the production of
sodium cyanide, which is
banned to be brought into the
country. Before, it
wasn't clear to me if the
Secretary-General had
communicated with WIPO about
their use of criminal
defamation against
journalists. But, is
this something that concerns
him? I also want to ask
you about the UN Federal
Credit Union (UNFCU) openly
soliciting deposits from… from
the Mission of North Korea, as
well as the employees of the
Mission despite having
previously settled sanctions
charges for just such activity
on another sanctioned
country. Do you think
that this is consistent with
this whole idea of tightening
up?
Spokesman Dujarric: I
don't speak for the Credit
Union. They're an
independent body. I
would agree… I would urge you
to question them. On the
[Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea] and the Fox News
report, obviously, I think
what's contained in the report
is disturbing and demands
looking into. The Panel
of Experts… the Security
Council Panel of Experts, as
you know, is an independent
team reporting to the
Council. And they have
the prerogative to look into
all alleged violations of DPRK
sanctions and report to the
Council
accordingly. I
think, as noted in the
article, the Panel's
coordinator said the Panel
will look into the
issue. And I think we'll
need… the Panel will do its
work and report back.
And if… we will obviously look
more directly into the issue,
as well from our end.
Inner City Press: Given
that there have been previous
allegations and reported
retaliation at WIPO concerning
activities with North Korea,
do you or the
Secretary-General think it's
something that at the CEB
[Chief Executives Board] or
some kind of system-wide, does
it need to be reiterated to
the UN agencies that these
sanctions are reported?
Spokesman: I think the
need… the absolute need to
respect the sanctions regime,
both whether it's from Member
States or within the UN, I
think, is clear and should be
clear to everyone.
UNFCU's
website lists
under “Missions to the UN in
New York eligible to join
UNFCU” that of “North Korea
(DPRK"). Inner City Press
asked UNFCU's Senior Manager
of Media Relations Elisabeth
Philippe questions including
“why some UN member states'
missions to the UN are
eligible to join UNFCU,
including the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea,
and others are not, why
members of UNA-USA became
eligible to join UNFCU, what
regulatory filings in any
UNFCU made for this change in
field of membership, and any
restrictions on the use of
these UNA-USA members' funds,
and what services UNFCU offers
to UN agencies and country
teams, in which countries, and
if there are any restrictions
or safeguards.”
On deeming
the North Korean mission and
all of its employees eligible,
UNFCU's Ms. Philippe told
Inner City Press, “The
employees of any mission to
the United Nations based in
New York are eligible to apply
for UNFCU membership. The
employees of all missions are
eligible to join once their
mission has submitted an
application and been
approved.” The website says
the mission itself can join
UNFCU. On May 10, Inner City
Press asked the chairman of
the UN Security Council's
North Korea Sanctions
Committee Sebastiano Cardi
about North Korea's embassy in
Berlin
renting out space as a hostel,
video
here. What safeguards
does UNFCU, with UNA-USA's
members in its field of
membership, have?
On UNFCU
expanding its field of
membership to including anyone
who joins UNA-USA, Ms.
Philippe told Inner City
Press, “UNA-USA is the largest
UN advocacy organization in
the United States. UNFCU is a
financial organization
providing retail banking for
the UN community. Members of
UNA-USA, who are US citizens
or permanent residents of the
US, are eligible to become
members of UNFCU. In December
2013, the National Credit
Union Administration (NCUA),
the US regulatory body which
oversees US federal credit
unions, approved the expansion
of UNFCU membership to include
UNA-USA based on a shared
mission and values in support
of the United Nations. UNA-USA
members who become members of
UNFCU are eligible for the
full suite of products and
services available to UNFCU’s
field of membership.”
But what
is in the “full suit of
products and services”
available from UNFCU? The US
Office of Financial Asset
Control or OFAC settled
charges against UNFCU for, in
connection with Mission
employees, violating
sanctions, see here. And Inner
City Press' third question,
about precisely what services
“UNFCU offers to UN agencies
and country teams” - including
for example in North Korea -
remained at publication time
unanswered. Now this: "As a
member-owned financial
institution that serves the UN
community globally, UNFCU
provides bank account services
to UN/agency staff, and
consultants subject to payroll
requirements of the various UN
agencies and subject to the
rules and regulations
governing all US Financial
Institutions. Accounts are
maintained in US dollars and
are protected by federal share
insurance through the National
Credit Union Administration.
UNFCU complies with US
regulations, including those
governing US economic
sanctions." But why then did
UNFCU settle charges of
sanctions violations? We'll
have more on this. Inner City
Press previously exclusively
reported for example
that "Sudanese nationals
working for the UN have had
part of their salaries paid
into UN Federal Credit Union
accounts, in U.S. dollars.
Then they were told that these
dollar accounts were frozen,
and could only be transferred
to the Bank of Khartoum."
Watch this site.
***
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