On
Syria,
ICP asks Samantha
Power of
Accountability,
Churkin of
Compliance, UK
of Jarba
By
Matthew
Russell Lee
UNITED
NATIONS,
September 26
-- After the
US and Russia
introduced
their
draft Syria
resolution to
the full UN
Security
Council on
Thursday
night, the
ambassadors of
Russia, the US
and UK came
out to take
questions.
Inner City
Press asked
each of them a
different
question.
To
Russian
Ambassador
Vitaly
Churkin, Inner
City Press
asked about
Operative
Paragraph 21
of the draft
resolution:
"Compliance
21.
Decides, in
the event of
non-compliance
with this
resolution,
including
unauthorized
transfer of
chemical
weapons, or
any use of
chemical
weapons by
anyone in the
Syrian Arab
Republic, to
impose
measures under
Chapter VII of
the United
Nations
Charter"
Inner
City Press
asked, that
would involve
coming back to
the Council,
to
determine
non-compliance,
right? Video
here, from
Minute 2:47.
Churkin said
yes, I think
this is
clear. This is
taken verbatim
from the
Geneva
agreement, one
has to
read it
carefully,
every word and
comma are very
important.
To
US Ambassador
Samantha
Power, Inner
City Press
asked about
Operative
Paragraph 15:
"Accountability
15.
Expresses its
strong
conviction
that those
individuals
responsible
for the use of
chemical
weapons in the
Syrian Arab
Republic
should be held
accountable"
Inner
City Press
asked, what
does this
mean? Should
be held
accountable
where? Video
here, from
Minute 8:44.
Power
said, "it is
essential to
see that
taking
chemical
weapons away
that just used
them is a very
intense form
of
accountability,
not a
traditional
form of
accountability
of the kind
you are
describing, of
course... The
ICC, you know
as well as we
do, the
resistance we
and
others have
faced in
pushing
forward
criminal
accountability,
we have
supported acct
of all kind
from the
beginning...
the day will
come."
To
UK Ambassador
Mark Lyall
Grant, Inner
City Press
asked about
the
earlier
meeting of
"Group of
Friends of
Syrian people
in honour
of the
President of
the National
Coalition of
Syrian
Revolution and
Opposition
Forces Mr.
Ahmad Al-Assi
Al-Jarba" --
since many of
the armed
groups in
Syria have
rejected
Jarba, where
does that
leave
him? (Inner
City Press asked the same of Khaled Saleh,
Jarba's
spokesperson,
video here.)
Lyall
Grant admitted
"that will be
a challenge,"
but pointed at
how many other
countries
recognize
Jarba. He put
the number at
117. But
doesn't
legitimacy
have to come
from
people INSIDE
Syria?
From
the UK (fast)
transcript
(USUN transcript,
and draft
resolution,
below)
Inner
City Press: In
the Group of
Friends
meeting that
took place
down the hall,
your
minister
Alistair Burt
spoke out, and
it seems like
the--the
Syrian
National
Coun-- the
opposition
council that
was there has
been kind
of denounced
by some of the
armed groups
in the
country. Some
of them
are Al Nusra
and ISIS, but
some of them
are not, some
of them are
actually part
of the Free
Syrian Army,
so what do
you-- It
seemed
like all the
governments in
there were
saying this is
the legitimate
representative
of the Syrian
people, but
how are you
gonna deal
with
the actual
armed
oppositions on
the ground
that's
fighting the
Assad
government.
What's the
idea of sort
of speaking
with these
guys who
are not there,
and who are
actually now
being kind of
denounced from
some of the
armed groups?
What's your
thinking on
that?
Amb.
Lyall Grant:
That
will be
challenge. I
mean, clearly,
it's important
that when the
Geneva
Conference
happens-- the
second Geneva
Conference
happens,
that there
should be two
delegations.
There should
be a
delegation
from the
Syrian regime,
and there
should be a
delegation
representing
the
opposition. At
the moment, of
course there
are many
splits in the
opposition,
but the Syrian
National
Coalition who
came here to
the
United Nations
this
afternoon,
they are the
legitimate
representatives
that 117
countries in
the world have
recognised as
the legitimate
representatives
of the Syrian
people. So
they will
certainly be
the people who
are
representing
the opposition
at a
Geneva
conference.
Now, they
themselves
recognise that
there are some
groups that
are outside
their
umbrella. They
have been
reaching out
to number of
them, there
are others
that they
reject because
they say
that they are
terrorists and
they don't
support our
aims for a
pluralist,
democratic
future in
Syria, and
they will have
to be
marginalised.
So, yes, it's
a challenge,
but clearly,
as you saw
from
the huge
numbers of
people who
came to see
the Syrian
National
Coalition,
they are
recognised
very widely by
nearly 2/3 of
the UN
membership as
the legitimate
representatives
of the Syrian
people.
Thank
you very much
indeed.
Watch this
site.
Watch
this site.
Here's the USUN
transcript of
Samantha
Power:
Inner City Press:
I wanted to
ask you about
the
accountability
section where
it says, you
know, it seems
to say,
expresses its
strong
conviction
that those
responsible
shall be held
accountable.
I just wonder,
what does that
mean -- should
be held
accountable
where? What
does it mean
in terms of
accountability
as you have
said it for
this event,
where does
this paragraph
lead?
Ambassador
Power:
Well I think
it’s very,
very important
to note that
this is a
profound,
this is
a …let me put
it a different
way.
It is
essential to
see that
taking
chemical
weapons away
from a regime
that just used
chemical
weapons, not
just on August
21st, but in a
whole series
of occasions
over the last
year, is a
very intense
form of
accountability.
It is not a
traditional
form of
accountability,
the kind that
you are
describing, of
course. But if
there is any,
I am not sure
that there is
any better
acknowledgement
of the world’s
horror and
outrage than
the fact that
the very
instrument of
terror that
was employed
is being taken
away from that
regime, so I
think that’s a
very, very
important
feature of
accountability
for the attack
that they
carried out on
the 21st of
August.
As regards, of
course to the
ICC and issues
of that
nature, you
know, you know
as well as we
do the
resistance
that we and
others have
faced in
pushing
forward
criminal
accountability
and again, let
me say that
we, the United
States, have
supported
accountability
of all kinds
from the very
beginning of
this
conflict.
We supported
the Commission
of Inquiry,
we’ve
supported the
Syrian Justice
and
Accountability
Center, the
evidence is
being
gathered. The
day will
come.
This is a
resolution
narrowly
focused on
taking Syria’s
chemical
weapons
program away,
eliminating it
so that it can
do no further
damage of the
kind it did so
recently.
Here is the
draft UNSC
resolution:
The
Security
Council,
PP1. Recalling the
Statements of
its President
of 3 August
2011, 21 March
2012, 5 April
2012, and its
resolutions
1540 (2004),
2042 (2012)
and 2043
(2012),
PP2. Reaffirming its
strong
commitment to
the
sovereignty,
independence
and
territorial
integrity of
the Syrian
Arab Republic,
PP3. Reaffirming that
the
proliferation
of chemical
weapons, as
well as their
means of
delivery,
constitutes a
threat to
international
peace and
security,
PP4. Recalling that
the Syrian
Arab Republic
on 22 November
1968 acceded
to the
Protocol for
the
Prohibition of
the Use in War
of
Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or
Other Gases
and of
Bacteriological
Methods of
Warfare,
signed at
Geneva on 17
June 1925,
PP5. Noting that
on 14
September
2013, Syria
deposited with
the
Secretary-General
its instrument
of accession
to the
Convention on
the
Prohibition of
the
Development,
Production,
Stockpiling
and Use of
Chemical
Weapons and on
their
Destruction
(Convention)
and declared
that it shall
comply with
its
stipulations
and observe
them
faithfully and
sincerely,
applying the
Convention
provisionally
pending its
entry into
force for the
Syrian Arab
Republic,
PP6. Welcoming the
establishment
by the
Secretary-General
of the United
Nations
Mission to
Investigate
Allegations of
the Use of
Chemical
Weapons in the
Syrian Arab
Republic (“the
Mission”)
pursuant to
General
Assembly
resolution
42/37 C (1987)
of 30 November
1987, and
reaffirmed by
resolution 620
(1988) of 26
August 1988,
and expressing appreciation
for the work
of the
Mission,
PP7. Acknowledging the
report of 16
September 2013
(S/2013/553)
by the
Mission, underscoring the
need for the
Mission to
fulfil its
mandate,
and emphasizing that
future
credible
allegations of
chemical
weapons use in
the Syrian
Arab Republic
should be
investigated,
PP8. Deeply
outraged by
the use of
chemical
weapons on 21
August 2013 in
Rif Damascus,
as concluded
in the
Mission’s
report, condemning the
killing of
civilians that
resulted from
it, affirming that
the use of
chemical
weapons
constitutes a
serious
violation of
international
law, and stressing that
those
responsible
for any use of
chemical
weapons
must be held
accountable,
PP9. Recalling the
obligation
under
resolution
1540 (2004)
that all
States shall
refrain from
providing any
form of
support to
non-State
actors that
attempt to
develop,
acquire,
manufacture,
possess,
transport,
transfer or
use weapons of
mass
destruction,
including
chemical
weapons, and
their means of
delivery,
PP10. Welcoming the
Framework for
Elimination of
Syrian
Chemical
Weapons dated
14 September
2013, in
Geneva,
between the
Russian
Federation and
the United
States of
America
(S/2013/565),
with a view to
ensuring the
destruction of
the Syrian
Arab
Republic’s
chemical
weapons
program in the
soonest and
safest manner,
and expressing its
commitment to
the immediate
international
control over
chemical
weapons and
their
components in
the Syrian
Arab Republic,
PP11. Welcoming the
decision of
the Executive
Council of the
Organization
for the
Prohibition of
Chemical
Weapons (OPCW)
of [XX
September
2013]
establishing
special
procedures for
the
expeditious
destruction of
the Syrian
Arab
Republic’s
chemical
weapons
program and
stringent
verification
thereof, and expressing its
determination
to ensure the
destruction of
the Syrian
Arab
Republic’s
chemical
weapons
program
according to
the timetable
contained in
the OPCW
Executive
Council
decision of
[XX September
2013],
PP12. Stressing that
the only
solution to
the current
crisis in the
Syrian Arab
Republic is
through an
inclusive and
Syrian-led
political
process based
on the Geneva
Communiqué of
30 June 2012,
and emphasising the
need to
convene the
international
conference on
Syria as soon
as possible,
PP13. Determining that
the use of
chemical
weapons in the
Syrian Arab
Republic
constitutes a
threat to
international
peace and
security,
PP14. Underscoring that
Member States
are obligated
under Article
25 of the
Charter of the
United Nations
to accept and
carry out the
Council's
decisions,
1. Determines that
the use of
chemical
weapons
anywhere
constitutes a
threat to
international
peace and
security;
2. Condemns in
the strongest
terms any use
of chemical
weapons in the
Syrian Arab
Republic, in
particular the
attack on 21
August 2013,
in violation
of
international
law;
3. Endorses the
decision of
the OPCW
Executive
Council [XX
September
2013], which
contains
special
procedures for
the
expeditious
destruction of
the Syrian
Arab
Republic’s
chemical
weapons
program and
stringent
verification
thereof and
calls for its
full
implementation
in the most
expedient and
safest manner;
4. Decides that
the Syrian
Arab Republic
shall not use,
develop,
produce,
otherwise
acquire,
stockpile or
retain
chemical
weapons, or
transfer,
directly or
indirectly,
chemical
weapons to
other States
or non-State
actors;
5. Underscores that
no party in
Syria should
use, develop,
produce,
acquire,
stockpile,
retain, or
transfer
chemical
weapons;
6. Decides that the Syrian Arab Republic
shall comply
with all
aspects of the
decision of
the OPCW
Executive
Council of [XX
September
2013] (Annex
I);
7. Decides that
the Syrian
Arab Republic
shall
cooperate
fully with the
OPCW and the
United
Nations,
including by
complying with
their relevant
recommendations,
by accepting
personnel
designated by
the OPCW or
the United
Nations, by
providing for
and ensuring
the security
of activities
undertaken by
these
personnel, by
providing
these
personnel with
immediate and
unfettered
access to and
the right to
inspect, in
discharging
their
functions, any
and all sites,
and by
allowing
immediate and
unfettered
access to
individuals
that the OPCW
has grounds to
believe to be
of importance
for the
purpose of its
mandate,
and decides that
all parties in
Syria shall
cooperate
fully in this
regard;
8. Decides to
authorize an
advance team
of United
Nations
personnel to
provide early
assistance to
OPCW
activities in
Syria, requests the
Director-General
of the OPCW
and the
Secretary-General
to closely
cooperate in
the
implementation
of the
Executive
Council
decision of
[XX September
2013] and this
resolution,
including
through their
operational
activities on
the ground,
and further
requests the
Secretary-General,
in
consultation
with the
Director-General
of the OPCW
and, where
appropriate,
the
Director-General
of the World
Health
Organization,
to submit to
the Council
within 10 days
of the
adoption of
this
resolution
recommendations
regarding the
role of the
United Nations
in eliminating
the Syrian
Arab
Republic’s
chemical
weapons
program;
9. Notes that
the Syrian
Arab Republic
is a party to
the Convention
on the
Privileges and
Immunities of
the United
Nations,
decides that
OPCW-designated
personnel
undertaking
activities
provided for
in this
resolution or
the decision
of the OPCW
Executive
Council of [XX
September
2013] shall
enjoy the
privileges and
immunities
contained in
the
Verification
Annex, Part
II(B) of the
Chemical
Weapons
Convention,
and calls on
the Syrian
Arab Republic
to conclude
modalities
agreements
with the
United Nations
and the OPCW;
10. Encourages Member States to provide support,
including
personnel,
technical
expertise,
information,
equipment, and
financial and
other
resources and
assistance, in
coordination
with the
Director-General
of the OPCW
and the
Secretary-General,
to enable the
OPCW and the
United Nations
to implement
the
elimination of
the Syrian
Arab
Republic’s
chemical
weapons
program,
and decides to
authorize
Member States
to acquire,
control,
transport,
transfer and
destroy
chemical
weapons
identified by
the
Director-General
of the OPCW,
consistent
with the
objective of
the Chemical
Weapons
Convention, to
ensure the
elimination of
the Syrian
Arab
Republic’s
chemical
weapons
program in the
soonest and
safest manner;
11. Urges all Syrian parties and interested
Member States
with relevant
capabilities
to work
closely
together and
with the OPCW
and the United
Nations to
arrange for
the security
of the
monitoring and
destruction
mission,
recognizing
the primary
responsibility
of the Syrian
government in
this regard;
12. Decides to review on a regular basis the
implementation
in the Syrian
Arab Republic
of the
decision of
the OPCW
Executive
Council [XX
September
2013] and this
resolution,
and requests the
Director-General
of the OPCW to
report to the
Security
Council,
through the
Secretary-General,
who shall
include
relevant
information on
United Nations
activities
related to the
implementation
of this
resolution,
within 30 days
and every
month
thereafter,
and requests further
the
Director-General
of the OPCW
and the
Secretary-General
to report in a
coordinated
manner, as
needed,
to the
Security
Council,
non-compliance
with this
resolution or
the OPCW
Executive
Council
decision of
[XX September
2013];
13. Reaffirms its readiness to consider promptly
any reports of
the OPCW under
Article VIII
of the
Chemical
Weapons
Convention,
which provides
for the
referral of
cases of
non-compliance
to the United
Nations
Security
Council;
14. Decides that Member States shall inform
immediately
the Security
Council of any
violation of
resolution
1540 (2004),
including
acquisition by
non-State
actors of
chemical
weapons, their
means of
delivery and
related
materials in
order to take
necessary
measures
therefore;
Accountability
15. Expresses its strong conviction that those
individuals
responsible
for the use of
chemical
weapons in the
Syrian Arab
Republic
should be held
accountable;
Political
transition
16. Endorses fully
the Geneva
Communiqué of
30 June 2012
(Annex II),
which sets out
a number of
key steps
beginning with
the
establishment
of a
transitional
governing body
exercising
full executive
powers, which
could include
members of the
present
Government and
the opposition
and other
groups and
shall be
formed on the
basis of
mutual
consent;
17. Calls for
the convening,
as soon as
possible, of
an
international
conference on
Syria to
implement the
Geneva
Communiqué,
and calls
upon all
Syrian parties
to engage
seriously and
constructively
at the Geneva
Conference on
Syria,
and underscores that
they should be
fully
representative
of the Syrian
people and
committed to
the
implementation
of the Geneva
Communiqué and
to the
achievement of
stability and
reconciliation;
Non-Proliferation
18. Reaffirms that
all Member
States shall
refrain from
providing any
form of
support to
non-State
actors that
attempt to
develop,
acquire,
manufacture,
possess,
transport,
transfer or
use nuclear,
chemical or
biological
weapons and
their means of
delivery,
and calls
upon all
Member States,
in particular
Member States
neighbouring
the Syrian
Arab Republic,
to report any
violations of
this paragraph
to the
Security
Council
immediately;
19. Demands that non-State actors not develop,
acquire,
manufacture,
possess,
transport,
transfer, or
use nuclear,
chemical or
biological
weapons and
their means of
delivery,
and calls
upon all
Member States,
in particular
Member States
neighbouring
the Syrian
Arab Republic,
to report any
actions
inconsistent
with this
paragraph to
the Security
Council
immediately;
20. Decides that
all Member
States shall
prohibit the
procurement of
chemical
weapons,
related
equipment,
goods and
technology or
assistance
from the
Syrian Arab
Republic by
their
nationals, or
using their
flagged
vessels or
aircraft,
whether or not
originating in
the territory
of the Syrian
Arab Republic;
Compliance
21. Decides,
in the event
of
non-compliance
with this
resolution,
including
unauthorized
transfer of
chemical
weapons, or
any use of
chemical
weapons by
anyone in the
Syrian Arab
Republic, to
impose
measures under
Chapter VII of
the United
Nations
Charter;
22. Decides to remain actively seized of the
matter.
ANNEX
1
OPCW
Executive
Council
Decision
ANNEX
II
Action
Group for
Syria Final
Communiqué
30
June 2012
, 
