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In Algiers Bombing Fall-Out, Veness Resigns,
But Confidential Report Points Further
Byline: Matthew Russell Lee of
Inner City Press at the UN: News Analysis
UNITED NATIONS,
June 24 -- More than six months
after the deadly bombing of UN premises in Algiers, the UN on Tuesday
released
a redacted
version of its follow-up report, and announced the
resignation of its head of
security, David Veness. The initial report is now online here, analyzed here
and below. Even the
redacted report issued by the UN raises questions of accountability. It states for example "the
Designated Official was neither forceful nor persistent with the
Algerian authorities to insist on the security measures
requested of the Government." (Page 25). This
Designated Officer was, in fact, an
official of the UN
Development Program, Marc de Bernis. As
is so
often the case with UNDP, de Bernis
not only didn't press the host country government in any way -- he
allowed
himself and the UN system safety issues to be marginalized. The
UN-release
report states
"As noted in the preliminary
DSS report on the 11 December 2007 attack, all contact by the UN
Designated
Official for Security (DO) and the Security Adviser (SA) with the
national
security authorities occurred through the Director General for Protocol
(DGP)
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). This restricted contact with
security
agencies was not limited to the UN; diplomatic missions in Algiers also
conduct
their security relations through the DGP/MFA. This is the practice in a
number
of other countries."
Having
access to the preliminary
DSS report, we find in paragraph 7 that
there
was an exception, for "large embassies." Why didn't the UN, with
multiple agencies represented in Algeria, get for itself as much access
as
large embassies of its member states?
Bombed UN premises in Algiers, accountability still not shown
The
preliminary DSS report lays out the history:
The security level
was set at phase IV in march
1994 (paragraph 3). The security level was lowered to phase III in
October 1996
(paragraph 4). Paragraph 4 continues to
say that by September 2004:
"The Algerian authorities
meanwhile expressed strong disapproval of the fact that Phase III was
still in
effect since it was seen as an 'unfair treatment which gave the country
an
undeserved bad image abroad to the extent that it kept out foreign
investment.' As a result of the recommendations in the report,
the
Secretary-General [Kofi Annan] approved the downgrading of the security
phase
from level III to III, in Algiers."
Paragraph 5
says that in April 2006, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Algeria
wrote to
Kofi Annan "expressing severe displeasure that significant parts of the
country outside of Algiers were still at phase II. He wanted the
whole
country to be phase I.
Paragraph 5 also says that in May 2006:
"At the request of the
Secretary-General [Kofi Annan], an inter-agency security assessment
mission
traveled to Algeria to re-evaluate the security phases. The mission
found that
the security situation in the country had "substantially improved"
and that the 'government security forces were more than capable and
willing to
provide security for UN staff and operations." Consequently, the
recommendation was made for a reduction from Phase II to Phase I of the
Security plan for other areas of the country besides Algiers.
THIS
RECOMMENDATION WAS APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 11 AUGUST 2006
and
remained in effect up to and until the bombing on 11 December
2007. IT
SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THIS ASSESSMENT WAS MADE BEFORE THE GSPC WAS
ALIGNED WITH
AL QAEDA."
In May
2007, the media branch of AQIM issued a direct threat against the
UN.
This was only nine months after Kofi Annan had downgraded the security
phase
for Algeria to its lowest phase, Phase I, which he had done following a
letter
of complaint from the Algerian foreign minister.
Only five months later, in October
2007, the Security Risk Assessment that was developed by the late
security
advisor Babacar Ndiaye characterized the risks from terrorist threats
as
"high", the potential impact as "severe" and the probability
of attack as "likely."
Paragraph 18 says that this document
(the SRA) was "approved by the DO" [Marc de Bernis]. So why wasn't
the security phase increased above phase I when this information came
to light?
Why was the phase downgraded to phase
II in the first place? Was it because of the letter of complaint
from the
Algerian foreign minister?
Now, some
seven months later, the UN is belatedly getting around to "establishing
accountability." The resignation of
David Veness,
first reported
by the Washington Times, is
not enough. Another major problem is that
UNDP should not be given any security responsibilities, given its
unquestioning
position vis a vis host governments.
To be
continued.
* * *
These reports are
usually also available through Google
News and on Lexis-Nexis.
Click
here for a Reuters
AlertNet piece by this correspondent
about Uganda's Lord's Resistance Army. Click
here
for an earlier Reuters AlertNet piece about the Somali National
Reconciliation Congress, and the UN's $200,000 contribution from an
undefined trust fund. Video
Analysis here
Feedback: Editorial
[at] innercitypress.com
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Other,
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in the ProQuest service, and now on Lexis-Nexis.
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