Biden Visit to Include 2 or 3 Iraq Resolutions, No Answers on
Costs or Security
December 14 -- One of three Security Council resolution
which the US would like adopted at the December 15 meeting chaired by
Vice President Joe Biden has not yet been finalized for a vote, a
self-described senior US official told the press on Tuesday.
Oil for Food Program, the US would like to removing restrictions on
Iraq's import of nuclear material, despite the country not yet having
ratified the additional protocol of the International Atomic Energy
mission to the UN has indicated a preference to
await full ratification by Iraq, but late Tuesday the senior US
official was still talking about all three resolutions being passed.
context of the
remarks was a conference call. Inner City Press dialed in, and to ask
a question pushed Star 1 as directed, giving name and affiliation
again. But Inner City Press was never called on, even as the
moderator said “it appears there are no more questions.”
confirmation that it is the Weapons of Mass Destruction or nuclear
resolution that is not yet finalized, Inner City Press had wanted
ask, as it has the UN Spokesman, who is paying for the alternations
in and around the Security Council for Joe Biden's visit.
December 10, a
large US delegation entered the Council chamber talking of Verizon
and putting in new communications lines for Wednesday's session. A
Council staffer told Inner City Press that Wednesday will be the
first time a US Vice President chairs the Security Council since
George H.W. Bush, as Reagans' VP, chaired a meeting. On the morning
of December 14 new metal detectors were in place. At the noon
briefing, Inner City Press asked
UN Spokesman Martin Nesirky:
Press: for this Wednesday, tomorrow’s Security Council event
featuring Vice-President Joe Biden, there have been a lot of, they’ve
even installed metal detectors, but on Friday, there was people going
into the Council to install new telephone lines. So, it all led me
to wonder, who is paying for this? Is it… is it… does the US
specifically reimburse the UN for these special security…
particularly, let’s say the phone lines, or is it something that
the UN absorbs the cost and, if so, what’s the basis of doing it
for this meeting and not other similarly vice-presidential meetings?
Well, you’re making assumptions there before establishing
the facts. So, let’s do that.
later, no answer had been given. Similarly, last month Inner City
Press asked Nesirky's Office to confirm that the UN in Iraq,
including SRSG Ad Melkert, is accepting security from the US forces.
The UN refused to confirm it, despite a New
Orleans Times Picayune
soldiers of Alpha Battery, 1/141, started out providing armed troops
and armored vehicles to protect the supply convoys. They now act as
the quick reaction force, which includes providing ground medical
evacuation to area helicopters that cannot reach and secure landing
zones, Fernandez said. They also staff entries to the United Nations
Villa, a compound where UN workers live, and specifically guard the
residence for the special representative for the UN secretary-general
in Iraq. While the UN officials have personal security personnel,
they also are shadowed by Alpha Battery when they travel. “They’re
not allowed to move without us,” Fernandez said. “They don’t
want to move without us.”
Mission to the UN or State Department will have an answer.
UN's Ban and Biden, previously, security, costs and IAEA ratification
budget document just released mentions that the UN's architectural
Iraq is in default:
7 December 2010
for the biennium 2010-2011
report on the programme budget for the biennium 2010-2011
the Advisory Committee
Advisory Committee recalls that the General Assembly, in section
VI of its resolution 64/245, approved a commitment authority of up to
$5 million for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI),
under section 33, Construction, alteration, improvement and major
maintenance, for the biennium 2010-2011, in order to undertake design
work for the construction of an integrated compound in Baghdad. The
Secretary-General indicates in paragraph 13 of his report that,
during 2010, a Project Manager (P-5) was recruited and an
architectural services contract was awarded for the project’s
schematic design, design development and construction documentation
phases. Upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that, to date, UNAMI
has entered into commitments with the contractor in the amount of
$2.97 million, comprising obligations of $2.39 million and
disbursements of $0.58 million.
Advisory Committee notes with concern that, as at 19 July 2010,
the architectural services contract has been in a “condition of
default” and that it is therefore unlikely that a full
specification design would be available until early 2011. The
Committee was also informed that the estimated costs would be far
higher than originally expected and that the construction timelines
would extend much further than planned. UNAMI is currently
considering alternative options in Baghdad and has identified an
existing site that will become available in 2011. The Committee notes
that the Secretary-General is seeking approval to appropriate the
amount of $5 million already approved as a commitment authority.
the context of its report on the budget for the United Nations
Assistance Mission in Iraq for 2011, the Advisory Committee has
expressed its concern about the reported situation that has resulted
in delays in the construction project and urged the Secretary-General
to resolve the problems at hand (see A/65/602, paras. 217-221).
Therefore, in view of the uncertainties concerning the planned
project, the Committee recommends that the amount of $5 million
already approved as a commitment authority not be appropriated at
present but rather that any actual expenditures arising from the
commitment authority be reported in the context of the second
performance report for the biennium 2010-2011.
* * *
Got Gambari Fired from Burma, Similar Suck Up to Sudan
Still Unacted On
11 -- UN official Ibrahim Gambari was targeted for
firing by the previous US administration, for being too close to the
military government of Myanmar, to which he was UN envoy, a cable
Wikileaked this week has shown:
Gambari's inappropriate claims of success regarding peripheral
issues, and his unwillingness to press the regime more forcefully for
progress have caused us to conclude that his continued involvement
undermines the good offices mission and should therefore be ended...
USUN is asked to demarche SYG Ban or Ambassador Kim to seek Gambari's
dismissal as SRSG for Burma. This demarche should occur as soon as
is telling: the overly dictator friendly Gambari was transferred by
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to cover Darfur in Sudan.
Gambari has gone out of his way not to investigate or report on
killing by the government of Omar al Bashir.
Sudan's Ambassador to the UN praised the UN Mission in Darfur and the
“seasoned diplomat” who is in charge -- Gambari.
Administration of Barack Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
and Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice done about Gambari? So far,
Security Council's October 2010 trip to Sudan and
Darfur, Susan Rice had multiple opportunities to give the
Administration's view of Gambari's performance, but did not.
Gambari in Darfur with Susan Rice et al., Oct 2010,
action not shown (c) MRLee
cable, in which Condoleezza Rice directed a demarche to Ban or
“Ambassador Kim” that Gambari should be take off the Burma file,
resulted in that action. If the argument is that the current US
Mission to the UN is working behind the scene on this, so far no
results have been seen.
F I D E N T I A L STATE 107438 SIPDIS
DELAURENTIS EO 12958 DECL: 09/23/2018
REPLACEMENT OF SRSG GAMBARI FOR BURMA MISSION
PDAS James Warlick. Reasons 1.4 (b)
is an action request. See para. 4.
views the "good offices" mission of the UN
Secretary General's Special Representative (SRSG) to Burma as an
important vehicle for encouraging democratic progress in Burma.
Consequently, Department has viewed with growing concern the lack of
progress on core political steps that the UNSC called on Burma to
take such as the immediate release of political prisoners and the
opening of a meaningful, time-bound political dialogue with
democratic and ethnic minority leaders, in particular, with Aung San
Suu Kyi (ASSK), over the course of SRSG Gambari's four missions to
Rangoon. Indeed, it appears that Gambari's access to regime officials
and ability to secure results has only contracted over the course of
these missions. His access to democratic leaders has been constrained
by both the regime and more recently a loss of confidence in Gambari
among leaders of the democracy movement.
appears unrealistically upbeat, pursuing and reporting
progress on peripheral matters (e.g., a possible economic forum, the
possible placement of a UN staff member in Rangoon) that are a
distraction from what the Security Council has articulated as
critical goals and identified as Gambari's mandate.
the key role of the good offices mission and
Gambari's inability to secure significant progress from the Burmese
regime, USUN is asked to demarche SYG Ban or Ambassador Kim to seek
Gambari's dismissal as SRSG for Burma. This demarche should occur as
soon as practical.
into account Gambari's usefulness in his concurrent role
as UN advisor on the International Compact with Iraq, as well as SYG
Ban's likely sensitivities in regard to a possible dismissal,
Department provides the following talking points (not/not to be left
as a non- paper) for use by USUN in this demarche:
UN) Begin points:
the United States has become increasingly concerned that
the UN good offices mission in regard to Burma is in dire jeopardy.
Gambari's fourth and latest trip to Burma
continued a disturbing pattern of regime-managed itineraries;
restricted access to key regime officials and activists; and complete
lack of progress on the critical issues that form the core of Mr.
Gambari's mandate: the opening of a meaningful and time-bound
dialogue with democratic and ethnic minority leaders, including Aung
San Suu Kyi, toward democratization and national reconciliation, and
the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners.
main responsibility for this lack of progress should be
attributed to regime intransigence, Mr. Gambari has not been willing
to acknowledge it. This lack of progress, Mr. Gambari's inappropriate
claims of success regarding peripheral issues, and his unwillingness
to press the regime more forcefully for progress have caused us to
conclude that his continued involvement undermines the good offices
mission and should therefore be ended.
no wish to embarrass Mr. Gambari and have no intent to link
any removal with a lack of progress in Burma, but we would ask that
you find a way to terminate gracefully his participation in this
particular mission. In particular, we cannot support further travel
to Burma for discussions with regime leadership by Mr. Gambari as
part of the good offices mission.
you not to rush to name a replacement. There have been a
series of Special Representatives, none of whom have succeeded due to
regime intransigence. Absent some sign that the regime is willing to
engage seriously, we fear appointment of a new envoy could actually
encourage the regime and some of its friends to continue to emphasize
process over substance. As you requested, however, we are willing to
share ideas of possible candidates as you consider next steps.
talk of your ramping up your personal involvement on Burma,
or perhaps even visiting. We think you could play an important role
but understand you will have to consider carefully how you would
engage. Although a trip by you could be useful, we believe it's
critical that the groundwork be laid so you can be confident that
your visit will result in tangible progress.
that the Burmese are unlikely to make major concessions
as a condition for your visit. However, we do not believe you should
go without a strong indication ahead of time that your visit would
coincide with some tangible, positive steps. Steps that we recommend
you insist upon are: the release of high-profile political prisoners;
the release of Aung San Suu Kyi or at least the easing of her house
arrest; insistence that you and any subsequent Special Representative
will be able to determine your own schedules, including meeting with
Aung San Suu Kyi, political prisoners, activists, and whomever else
you wish; and that you will have access to the senior most leadership
of the Burmese regime; agreement on specific steps to begin a
dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and other democratic and ethnic
leaders; and a guarantee that any Special Representative will be
granted a multiple entry visa.